The debate about the desirability of using drugs to enhance human skills encompasses cognitive abilities such as memory and attention, and moral capacities such as emotional empathy and a sense of fairness. These two strands of literature in bioethics have grown relatively independent from each other, and an implicit framing assumption has emerged suggesting that apparently morally neutral cognitive capacities and paradigmatically moral capacities are distinct and vary independently of each other. Here, we identify key distinctions between competing accounts of cognitive enhancement and moral enhancement and argue that, despite the polarized nature of the bioethical debate, cognitive and moral capacities are intertwined. For example, moral behavior can be improved by enhancing “morally neutral” abilities such as attention span; and cognitive skills can be honed by means of socio-moral interaction. Further, cognitive skill is frequently assigned the abstract status of virtue and treated in the same way as more paradigmatically “moral” traits. We argue that the distinction between moral and cognitive enhancement is more apparent than real, since despite being nominally treated as distinct, cognitive and moral skills are frequently interdependent. As such we present evidence to support the claim that the enhancement of these two kinds of capacities cannot be clearly disaggregated from each other in the way that the theoretical poles of the debate in the literature suggest. We synthesize relevant scientific and bioethical literature and combine it with a line of analysis derived from Peter Hacker to show more clearly the terms of what can be said intelligibly about cognitive and moral skills and their enhancement. As a result of this analysis, we conclude that ethical questions in human bioenhancement are only fully intelligible at the level of persons imbued with feelings, thoughts, intentions, desires, values, and abilities, embedded within a particular social context, rather than at the level of pharmacological modulation of particular cognitive or affective capacities which, though conceptually distinguishable, in the embodied context of moral agency are profoundly intertwined.

Psychiatric genomics has the potential to radically improve the prevention and early intervention of serious mental and neurodevelopmental disorders worldwide. However, little work has been done on the ethics of psychiatric genomics—an oversight that could result in poor local uptake, reduced practical/clinical application, and ethical violations in this rapidly developing area of scientific research. As part of the Global Project of the Stanley Center for Psychiatric Research, the Global Initiative in Neuropsychiatric GenEthics (NeuroGenE) based at the University of Oxford aims to embed ethical inquiry within scientific investigation and engage with fundamental ethical questions around a psychiatric genomics approach to mental and neurodevelopmental disorder. This position paper sets out the core aims of the NeuroGenE research programme and explores the importance of a crosscutting research orientation in this field based on multidisciplinary methodologies which can ensure that efforts to translate and apply global psychiatric genomics in public policy and clinical practice are ethically grounded strategies, respectful of different cultures and contexts.

Most research regarding youth with autism spectrum disorder has not focused on their first-person perspectives providing limited insight into methodologies best suited to eliciting their voices. We conducted a synthesis of methods previously used to obtain the first-person perspectives of youth with various disabilities, which may be applicable to youth with autism spectrum disorder. Two-hundred and eighty-four articles met the inclusion criteria of our scoping review. We identified six distinct primary methods (questionnaires, interviews, group discussion, narratives, diaries, and art) expressed through four communication output modalities (language, sign language and gestures, writing, and images). A group of parents who have children with autism spectrum disorder were then presented with a synthesis of results. This parent consultation was used to build on approaches identified in the literature. Parents identified barriers that may be encountered during participant engagement and provided insights on how best to conduct first-person research with youth with autism spectrum disorder. Based on our findings, we present a novel methodological framework to capture the perspectives of youth with various communication and cognitive abilities, while highlighting family, youth, and expert contributions.

Over the last decade, there has been an explosion of digital interventions that aim to either supplement or replace face-to-face mental health services. More recently, a number of automated conversational agents have also been made available, which respond to users in ways that mirror a real-life interaction. What are the social and ethical concerns that arise from these advances? In this article, we discuss, from a young person’s perspective, the strengths and limitations of using chatbots in mental health support. We also outline what we consider to be minimum ethical standards for these platforms, including issues surrounding privacy and confidentiality, efficacy, and safety, and review three existing platforms (Woebot, Joy, and Wysa) according to our proposed framework. It is our hope that this article will stimulate ethical debate among app developers, practitioners, young people, and other stakeholders, and inspire ethically responsible practice in digital mental health.